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Abstract: Democracy is in trouble, and it is democracy’s own fault—that is Robert Talisse’s intriguing 
contention is his recent book, Overdoing Democracy: Why We Must Put Politics in its Place (2019). What gets 
democracy into trouble, according to Talisse, is the idea that a democratic form of government is intrinsically 
valuable, which in turn entails a deliberative conception of democracy that, in combination with the social-
psychological fact of social sorting, leads to rampant polarization. According to Talisse, we therefore need to 
put democracy in its place by resisting the expansive view of the scope of democracy and making room for non-
political spaces of interaction, in which we can form civic friendships. However, in what follows, I argue that 
what Talisse has actually provided is an excellent reason for rejecting rather than merely mitigating the 
detrimental effects of the idea that democracy is intrinsically valuable. Specifically, we ought to stop fetishizing 
democracy and instead embrace an instrumentalist view of democracy as a social practice that is instituted and 
maintained for a purpose external to itself. Once we do this, democracy no longer needs saving from itself. 




I. DEMOCRACY’S AUTOIMMUNE DISORDER 
Democracy is in trouble—and it is democracy’s own fault. That is Robert Talisse’s contention 
is his recent book, Overdoing Democracy: Why We Must Put Politics in its Place (2019). The claim 
that democracy is in some form of trouble has been made many times before, of course, but typically 
either by defenders who feel that we need to do more democracy in response to this predicament, or 
by detractors who want to convince us that democracy, at least in its current form, probably is a bad 
idea to begin with, perhaps because the public simply is not up to the task. Talisse’s book is unique in 
being a passionate defense of democracy that wants us to do less of it for the sake of saving it from 
itself. 
What gets democracy into trouble, according to Talisse, is the idea—understandably popular 
among its defenders—that a democratic form of government is intrinsically valuable. That is, while 
democracy certainly might be valuable as an instrument to a number of other things, such as stability 
and respect for people’s rights, the value of democracy is not exhausted by its instrumental value. As 
Talisse explains, “democracy [is] a moral ideal of government among social equals, and […] the 
value of democracy as it is practiced in the real world derives from the value of the ideal to which it 
aspires” (13).i Moreover, this intrinsic value explains the legitimacy, i.e., the right to rule, of 
democratic government: “This ability to enact political rule among equals renders democracy a 
uniquely legitimate form of government; that is, it is in virtue of democracy’s capacity to respect 
citizens’ equality that democratic government is entitled to the power it wields” (12-13; emphasis in 
original). 
Specifically, according to Talisse, such rule among equals calls for a democratic practice that 
has citizens engage one another in a constant, public, and deliberative dialogue. As he writes, “we are 
all deliberative democrats in the sense that political practice aspires to deliberative democracy” (65; 
emphasis in original). This is as it should be, in his view: “some version of deliberativism is correct; I 
hold that a certain version of deliberative democracy in fact succeeds as reconciling the state’s 
entitlement to coercive power with the moral equality of democratic citizens” (64). At the same time, 
the need for widespread public engagement means that “politics quickly becomes, at least 
presumptively, omnipresent” (63). Whether in the office, at school, in the park, or while shopping for 
groceries, the demands of democracy as rule among co-equals, engaging one another in a deliberative 
dialogue, means that politics ends up being everywhere. 
Many political theorists might welcome this fact, of course—if democracy is as important as 
we think it is, then what is wrong with people constantly engaging one another in line with its 
presumably praiseworthy ideals? The problem, according to Talisse, arises due to social sorting, the 
well-established tendency of all of us to seek out people who are like us, a tendency sociologists refer 
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to as homophily (McPherson, Smith- Lovin, and Cook 2001). Political homophily is particularly well-
established (Ackland and Shorish 2014), to the point that people even date (Huber and Malhotra 
2017) and mate (Alford et al. 2011) in political clusters. Likeminded groups in turn tend to polarize, 
in the specific sense that they over time will tend to become more confident in more extreme versions 
of the views shared by members of their group. Indeed, Talisse makes a convincing case on the basis 
of the empirical literature that such polarization does not even require active engagement with 
members of one’s group; all it takes for someone to polarize in aforementioned sense is the perception 
(true or not) on the part of the person that some particular view is popular or otherwise endorsed by 
people sharing their social identity (117). 
This, then, is the problem: the idea that democracy is intrinsically valuable—I will refer to this 
as the intrinsicalist view in what follows—entails a deliberative conception of democracy that, in 
combination with the social-psychological fact of social sorting, leads to rampant polarization. And 
while “the democratic ideal of self-government among equals can be pursued only when citizens can 
engage in collective reasoning about their shared political order”, doing so brings about a kind of 
polarization which “directly attacks our capacities to properly enact democratic citizenship, dissolving 
our abilities to treat our fellow citizens as our political equals” (123). It is for this reason, Talisse 
suggests, that democracy suffers from an autoimmune disorder (126); the expansive view of the scope 
of democracy called for by the deliberative conception, meant to protect citizens from illegitimate 
exercises of power and ensure a just and stable polity, is attacking democracy from within. 
So what are we to do? According to Talisse, we need to put democracy in its (proper) place by 
resisting the expansive view of the scope of democracy and making room for non-political spaces of 
interaction, in which we can form civic friendships. Doing so will help “rework our view of our 
political adversaries” (170), reduce polarization, and ultimately save democracy from itself. In what 
follows, I will argue that what Talisse has actually provided is an excellent reason for rejecting rather 
than merely mitigating the detrimental effects of the intrinsicalist view. Specifically, we ought to stop 
fetishizing democracy by ascribing to it an intrinsic value that it does not have, and instead embrace 
an instrumentalist view of democracy as a social practice that is instituted and maintained for a 
purpose external to itself. Once we do this, democracy no longer needs saving from itself. 
 
II. A FALSE CHOICE 
Return to the idea, mentioned above, that democracy is “a moral ideal of government among 
social equals” and that “the value of democracy as it is practiced in the real world derives from the 
value of the ideal to which it aspires” (13). Let us assume for the sake of argument that, if that ideal 
were to be realized, it would be intrinsically valuable. Of course, since an ideal, it is not realized—at 
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best, it is one that we are striving towards. On the view Talisse is sketching here, however, the 
intrinsic value of the ideal is somehow still inherited by the imperfect instances that consist in us 
aspiring to that ideal. This is a puzzling thought. An ideal being valuable does not entail that aspiring 
to it will be valuable—sometimes, it is quite to the contrary. This can be illustrated in the political 
domain with reference to many ideologies that have a revolutionary agenda: even given a highly 
attractive end-state, pursuing that end state might bring about significant strife and suffering, and as 
such be of substantial disvalue. As the saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. 
For that reason, it is clear that any value of actual democratic practice in pursuit of a democratic 
ideal cannot derive from the value of that ideal. This does not rule out that such practice might of 
course be valuable independently of that ideal, and as such be able to stand on its own two feet, so to 
speak. Whether this is a dialectical avenue available in general, however, it is not one that is open to 
Talisse. Remember, according to Talisse, the intrinsicalist view (as I am calling it) ultimately leads to 
a level of polarization in the electorate that makes democratic practice a threat to its own continued 
existence. Clearly, such democratic practice is not of value, neither intrinsically nor instrumentally. If 
anything, it is of negative value. This raises the question that I will be concerned with throughout: has 
Talisse not then given us excellent reason to jettison the intrinsicalist view? 
Talisse does not think so, of course, but why? Perhaps he thinks that, even if holding on to the 
intrinsicalist view might have bad consequences, abandoning that view might be even worse. This 
would offer some reason to pursue a route of mitigating the effects of that view, in the manner that 
Talisse does, rather than to reject it. Note, for example, that in framing our democratic predicament, 
he gives the impression that we have to choose between the intrinsicalist view and a form of 
minimalism. The type of minimalism he has in mind is a Schumpeterian view of democracy on which 
people are expected to engage with the democratic process through occasional elections, but that, 
“once a democratic election takes place, the citizenry must withdraw from politics and attend to other 
things, lest they be guilty of ‘political back-seat driving.’” (Talisse 2019: 31), as Schumpeter calls it. 
Ironically, given Talisse’s concerns about polarized democratic discourse, the intrinsicalist and 
minimalist views inhabit two poles on the opposite ends of a spectrum from highly demanding and 
ambitious theories to those that are less demanding and more realistic (according to its proponents) or 
cynical (according to its detractors). And contrary to what his treatment might lead us to believe, they 
are not our only options. 
For example, while minimalism is arguably a type of instrumentalism—it sees democracy as an 
imperfect but still fairly efficient mechanism for an efficient political competition, provided that 
people know their place and refrain from meddling too much in the policy details—it is by no means 
the only kind available. In its most general form, the instrumentalist about democracy maintains that, 
if democracy is to be endorsed, it is because it is a form of social technology that is highly—or at least 
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comparatively—successful in bringing about good things. For example, Amartya Sen (1981) 
famously demonstrated that famines tend not to happen in democracies. Moreover, democracies 
violate human rights at a much lower rate compared to autocracies (Poe and Tate 1994). More 
fundamentally, according to John Stuart Mill (2008/1861), a distinctly liberal form of democracy, 
where popular rule is constrained by substantial constitutional protections for people’s rights, 
promotes the (to him) ultimate good of self-realization. 
The case of Mill’s instrumentalism in particular should bring home the point that being 
instrumentalist does not automatically make you a minimalist Schumpeterian. Talisse might maintain 
that this is a distinction without a difference. Schumpeter clearly had a theory of democracy, but it is 
arguable whether he was a democrat. Perhaps the same should be said about Millian instrumentalism. 
As noted by Richard Arneson (2004), instrumentalism entails that “any individual has a moral right to 
exercise political power just to the extent that the granting of this right is productive of best 
consequences overall” (40). In line with this thought, Mill (2008/1861) infamously defended a plural 
voting scheme, where “higher moral or intellectual being[s]” (334) were to have a greater number of 
votes than the rest of us. Mill was clearly a utilitarian liberal first, and democrat (in the sense of 
popular rule) second, so when judging that “the benefits of completely universal suffrage cannot be 
obtained without bringing with them […] a chance of more than equivalent evil” (339), any 
commitment on his part to universal popular rule based on the one-person-one-vote principle had to 
bend to utilitarian considerations. 
However, Mill’s case for plural voting is a non-essential component of Mill’s theory, which 
moreover does not sit very comfortably alongside his other commitments. Consider, for example, the 
manner in which a plural voting scheme inevitably would end up weighting your political say with 
reference to factors that will inevitably track the distinction between the privileged and the less 
privileged. As David Brink notes: 
Interestingly, while [Mill] does not seem especially sensitive to concerns about the bad effects 
of second-class citizenship in Considerations of Representative Government, he seems much 
more sensitive to such concerns in The Subjection of Women […] [where he] is acutely aware 
of the variety of ways in which women’s contributions can be discouraged and undervalued and 
of the individual and social costs of women’s second-class status. Had Mill been as mindful of 
the costs of according workers second-class citizenship as he would later be of the costs of 
according women second-class status, he might have been more skeptical of weighted voting 
than he in fact was (Brink 2013: 248). 
For this reason—among others—we do well to discard Mill’s plural voting proposal. What 
remains once we have done so is a type of instrumentalism that ascribes a value to democracy that 
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cannot be reduced to the mere facilitation of effective political competition, and as such goes beyond 
minimalism. Moreover, rejecting the intrinsicalist view—and with it, the expansive conception of 
deliberative democratic practice that Talisse takes it to entail—in favor of a broadly Millian, 
instrumentalist view means that a commitment to democracy no longer inevitably bring you to a 
polarized society wherein democracy needs to be saved from itself. 
 
III. THE PROS AND CONS OF FETISHIZING DEMOCRACY 
If what was argued in the previous section is correct, jettisoning the intrinsicalist view does not 
force you to embrace a minimal, Schumpeterian view of democracy. However, it might be argued that 
there are instrumental reasons to hold on to the intrinsicalist view, even if strictly speaking false, on 
account of how it helps maintain a robust commitment to democracy within the popular imagination, 
that prevents people from turning to non-democratic options as soon as they do not like the outcome. 
One way to make this case is as follows. 
Democracy is today the dominant form of government. That is not to say that most countries 
are democratic by a reasonably demanding standard. It is however to say that democracy is the most 
salient, normative reference point for governments, as evidenced by how even patently non-
democratic countries try to increase their perceived legitimacy by donning at least its linguistic cloak, 
and by holding electoral events that they claim are free and fair. But this dominance is of course a 
fairly recent phenomenon. Consider the long process in many European countries and elsewhere, 
whereby demands for popular rule and constitutional protections had to contend with established and 
powerful monarchies. In resisting such demands, monarchies appealed to myths about divine rights, 
of the kind pummeled by John Locke in his First Treatise on Government (2003/1689). On the 
uneven historical path to the type of imperfect constitutional democracies that some of us are lucky 
enough to live in today, democracy would have needed its own set of myths. In particular, since a 
prominent objection to popular rule is that the people are not fit to rule, and democracy therefore will 
lead to poor decisions and bad consequences, one of the most powerful myths about democracy is that 
it is valuable for its own sake: that democratic decision-procedures are intrinsically valuable and on 
that account legitimate, independently of whether the resulting decisions is good or bad by some 
independent standard. 
Particularly when democracy was in its infancy, this myth of intrinsic value would have been 
an extremely useful one. And in addition to its many other accomplishments in regard to the 
consequences of democratic government—some of which have been mentioned already—one 
particularly impressive feat on the part of the democratic project is that this myth has arguably 
become largely internalized by citizens of democratic countries. And this is in many ways a good 
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thing: to make democracy work, it is important that people do not constantly second guess 
democratically generated results, and the best way to have people not do that is to have them believe 
that those results are legitimate simply in virtue of having been arrived at through a democratic 
process. 
In short, we have come to fetishize democracy, and in some respects for good reasons. Talk of a 
fetish is called for on two grounds. First, we have come to imbue the institution of democracy with a 
type of value that it is far from clear that it actually possesses, namely a value possessed 
independently of instrumentalist considerations. Following Alvin Goldman and Erik J. Olsson, we 
may refer to this as value autonomisation (Goldman and Olsson 2009). Second, as Talisse himself 
argues, we have come to concern ourselves with democracy to an unhealthy, if not obsessive degree 
that threatens to get in the way of the very goods that democracy will generate when functioning well. 
Talisse’s own example with the person whose pursuit of a healthy lifestyle—clearly, an instrumental 
good—is compromised by an unhealthy and single-minded fixation with exercise, can equally be 
described as a case of a fetish, in the sense I have in mind.  
As already hinted at, however, a fetish need not be a bad thing. In particular, as I am using the 
term, something can qualify as a fetish simply in virtue of value autonomisation and in the absence of 
an unhealthy obsession. To illustrate, consider Mill’s theory of the value of moral virtues. On his 
instrumentalist view, “actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end 
than virtue” (36). For Mill, a hedonist, the end in question is happiness, in the sense spelled out with 
reference to self-realization in other work. However, Mill notes that many people value virtues for 
their own sake, independently of their consequences. Utilitarians can account for that because they 
“not only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end, but 
[...] also recognize as a psychological fact the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in 
itself, without looking to any end beyond it” (36). In other words, while not intrinsically valuable—
only happiness is—virtues tend to yield happiness, both for others and for the virtuous individual 
themselves, who can derive happiness from engaging in virtuous conduct. For that reason, the fact 
that people fetishize the virtues, by treating as an intrinsic value something that is not, need not be a 
bad thing, in so far as it has them reliably engage in conduct that has good consequences.ii 
Something similar might have held in the case of democracy: fetishizing it might at some points 
in time have helped reinforce a robust commitment to its institution through value autonomisation, 
and as such secured an effective mechanism for having people reliably engage in instrumentally 
beneficial conduct, including in cases where they might otherwise have been inclined to second-guess 
the institution in cases where they did not support the outcome. But as Talisse shows, whether that has 
been the case at some point in some places, it is at least not so in the USA of today; there, fetishizing 
democracy has led to a counterproductive fixation on the instrument that gets in the way of the goods 
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it should be generating. In the next section, I shall argue that, rather than holding on to the myth 
inherent in the intrinsicalist view and trying to mitigate the problems of fetishism through non-
political activities in the way that Talisse recommends, it is time to stop fetishizing democracy. 
 
IV. WHY WE SHOULD STOP FETISHIZING DEMOCRACY 
Let us take stock. We have seen that Talisse traces the problem of overdoing democracy back 
to what I have called the intrinsicalist view, i.e., even if democracy is valuable at least in part owing 
to the goods that it brings about, democracy is also valuable independently of any instrumental 
considerations on account of involving a pursuit of a democratic ideal of government among equals. It 
was then noted that pursuing a valuable ideal is not necessarily valuable, and that Talisse’s own 
argument in the case of democracy shows it to be downright detrimental. Moreover, it was argued that 
Talisse gives the impression that we have to choose between that intrinsicalist view and a thoroughly 
minimal view, on which the only thing to be said in favor of democracy is that it provides a 
framework for efficient political competition, provided that citizens know their place and do not 
meddle too much outside of the occasional election. However, this is a false choice, as it ignores a 
variety of instrumentalist views that have much more going for them than minimalism, including the 
type of view defended by Mill.  
Moreover, on that type of view, we can explain why it would under certain circumstances still 
make sense to ascribe intrinsic value to the democratic process, even if it is in fact not valuable in that 
manner—i.e., why there might be situations in which it is advisable to fetishize democracy. However, 
Talisse’s argument provides an excellent example of fetishization gone wrong, our commitment to 
democracy having turned into an obsession, whereby the omnipresence of democratic citizenship 
renders us unable to do it well. So, to save democracy, why not finally jettison the intrinsicalist view, 
and stop fetishizing democracy? I can think of two reasons for why someone like Talisse might 
hesitate to do that so. In closing, I will explain why these reasons ultimately are not good ones. 
First, it might be argued that a thoroughgoing instrumentalism about democracy is undesirable 
in making the case for democracy hostage to empirical circumstance. As Arneson (2004) writes, with 
characteristic directness: “The choice between autocracy and democracy should be decided according 
to the standard of best results.” (41). In other words, on the instrumentalist view, it is perfectly 
possible that a highly competent form of autocracy is the most legitimate form of government, 
because most successful from the point of view of generating the relevant goods. This might worry a 
defender of the intrinsicalist view. At the same time, this is a somewhat strange worry for an 
intrinsicalist to have. Given a plausible set of goods, it is difficult to think of historical examples 
where autocracies have done a particularly good job of securing as opposed to violating them. That 
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means that the intrinsicalist would have to have a particularly pessimistic view of what democracies 
can actually achieve. Only then would democracy having to rest on its instrumentalist credentials pose 
any risk to a forceful and convincing case for its adoption and retention.iii 
Another concern about rejecting the intrinsicalist view is that it might make democracy 
unstable. This is a recurring theme in Talisse’s work.iv If ‘my side’ loses out in an election, why 
should I stick with democracy? If I believe that there is something intrinsically just about that process, 
then perhaps that will motivate me to see past my disappointment, and realize that there is something 
to respect about the process, quite apart from whether it gets me what I want. This point is of course 
related to the one made in the previous section, when discussing the potential virtue of fetishizing 
democracy under some circumstances. But what is clear from Talisse’s book is that we are not in 
those circumstances, given that democratic fetishism currently is leading to polarizing dysfunction. In 
light of that, an instrumentalist conception of democratic participation might just be exactly what we 
need: if we deliberate together as citizens for a purpose rather than for its own sake, it is easy to make 
the case that we perhaps should do things differently in order to do it well. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
I am of course not pretending that the points in the previous section convincingly respond to all 
concerns that someone might have—and that many have had—about democratic instrumentalism. 
Doing so would require re-visiting several long-standing debates in political philosophy and 
democratic theory. But my focus here has been more narrow than this, in specifically looking to 
engage the view put forward by Talisse in his book. Because whether he intends it or not, Talisse has 
offered a strong argument against the intrinsicalist view—it has bad consequences; indeed, bad 
enough that democracy needs to be saved from itself. In so doing, he has provided a novel, indirect 
argument for democratic instrumentalism.  
As I have argued, the relevant type of instrumentalism can (a) be easily distinguished from a 
Schumpeterian minimalism, thereby rejecting the false choice that Talisse seems to set up between 
intrinsicalism and minimalism; (b) account for the occasional virtue, and thereby also the appeal, of 
fetishizing democracy under conditions where doing so will strengthen our commitment to it; and yet 
also (c) explain why the very predicament that Talisse argues that we are in gives us excellent reason 
to stop fetishizing democracy, and embracing the view that democracy is valuable because it has a 
purpose. What is that purpose? The type of self-realization that Mill has in mind is an attractive 
candidate, although by no means the only one. Interestingly, however, Talisse comes close to just 
such a view in introducing his own solution: 
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[…] the problem of overdoing democracy in part arises from our tendency to lose track of the 
fact that, even supposing that its value is intrinsic, democracy nonetheless is for something, and 
that something is not simply more or even better democracy. I will make the case that the point 
of democracy is to foster valuable human relationships and lives that are devoted, collectively 
and individually, to meaningful projects that lie beyond the struggles of politics (36). 
This, alongside the other considerations brought up above, makes one wonder why Talisse 
insists on holding on to the intrinsicalist view. Given where Talisse ends up, the step towards some 
non-minimal form of instrumentalism seems small and, at least according to this author, well-
motivated. He agrees that it creates severe problems; the entire book is motivated by that fact. He also 
agrees that democracy has a purpose, and value, external to itself—that it is for something that is not 
about politics. Perhaps it is not so much that democracy needs to be put in its place, as that those of us 
theorizing about its nature have tended to misplace it. 
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